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Systemic Risk Through Securitization:
The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure
PATRICIA A. McCoy, ANDREY D. PAVLOV & SUSAN M. WACHTER
During the recent housing boom, private-label securitization without
regulation was unsustainable. Without regulation, securitization allowed
mortgage industry actors to gain fees and to put off risks. The ability to
pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for market share
by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing.
Lenders who did not join in the easing of lending standards were crowded
out of the market. Meanwhile, the mortgages underlying securities
became more exposed to growing default risk, but investors did not receive
higher rates of return. Artificially low risk premia caused the asset price
of houses to go up, leading to an asset bubble and creating a breeding
ground for market fraud. The consequences of lax lending were covered
up and there was no immediate failure to discipline the markets.
The market might have corrected this problem if investors had been
able to express their negative views by short selling mortgage-backed
securities, thereby allowing fundamental market value to be achieved.
However, the one instrument that could have been used to short sell
mortgage-backed securities-the credit default swap-was also infected
with underpricing due to lack of minimum capital requirements and
regulation to facilitate transparent pricing. As a result, there was no
opportunity for short selling in the private-label securitization market. The
paper ends with a proposal for countercyclical regulation to prevent a
race to the bottom during the height of the business cycle.
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Systemic Risk Through Securitization:
The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure
PATRICIA A. MCCOy,* ANDREY D. PAVLOV** & SUSAN M. WACHTER***
I. SUBPRIME HAPPENED FOR A REASON: DEREGULATION IN A TIME OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Large-scale secondary markets for mortgage instruments have existed
since the 1980s, but it was only in the late 1990s and 2000s that those
markets were deregulated. Similarly, subprime home loans came of age
against the backdrop of mortgage deregulation in the 1980s. This Article
details the legal acts of commission and omission and the consequences of
this deregulated environment, both due to the lack of regulation of new
instruments and lax enforcement of the regulations that remained.
This deregulation and feeble enforcement enabled and drove the
demand for new types of risky mortgages.! Specifically, these new types
of mortgages were financed by the private-label securitization market,
which developed originally in parallel with the more traditional Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac securitization structure (also known as "agency-backed"
securitization). Wall Street firms bundled these mortgages into mortgage-
backed securities for sale on the private-label market. 2  Initially, the
private-label market securitized "jumbo" mortgages, which were larger but
not necessarily riskier than mortgages securitized through Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and which were bundled into securities whose movements
tracked those of Fannie and Freddie very closely.3  But starting in the
* George J. and Helen M. England Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
Visiting Associate Professor of Real Estate at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management and Professor of Real Estate, Finance
and City and Regional Planning at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
1 Wachovia's former chairman and chief executive officer, Ken Thompson, described how
securitization fed the demand for lax loans:
The financial engineering [securitization] . . . was in fact among the primary
contributors to the risky lending practices that led to home price bubbles in many
markets.... Home prices were buoyed by the willingness of institutional investors
across the world to buy these subprime loans in the form of complex securities
created by investment banks.
Wachovia Corp., Wachovia Corp. 2007 Annual Report, at 3-4 (Feb. 19, 2008), available at
http://thomson.mobular.net/thomson/7/2550/299 5/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2008).
2 For a description of private-label mortgage securitization, see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,
2045-48 (2007).
' Together, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are known as the "government-sponsored entities" or
"GSEs." Their role has been to repackage mortgages into securities and guarantee these mortgages'
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1990s, the private-label market evolved to securitize mortgages-most
notably subprime mortgages and nontraditional mortgages -that were
qualitatively different from the lending historically supported either by
depository institutions or agency-backed securitization in the United
States.
During the late 1990s, the private-label market was largely confined to
"jumbo" prime mortgages. This of course changed. The private-label
market grew dramatically, with issuances rising from twenty-four percent
of all mortgage-backed securities in 2003, totaling $586 billion, to a fifty-
five percent share, totaling $1.19 trillion in 2005.6 A large share of the
growth came from the subprime and Alt-A markets,7 while the total
nonprime market, including closed-end and home equity loans,8 grew to
forty-six percent of all home loans originated by 2006. (See Figure 1.)
principal, returns, and payment to investors. For discussion of the evolving role of Fannie and Freddie,
see Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International
Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 93, 97-99, 106, 108-12; Richard K. Green & Susan M.
Wachter, The Housing Finance Revolution, 31st Economic Policy Symposium: Housing, Housing
Finance & Monetary Policy, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 27-28, 30,
33-34, 42 (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2007/PDF/
2007.08.21.WachterandGreen.pdf [hereinafter Green & Wachter, The Housing Finance Revolution].
Jumbo securities typically yielded returns to investors that were about twenty-five basis points higher
than the rate of return of Fannie and Freddie securities.
4 Subprime mortgages carried higher interest rates and fees and were designed for borrowers with
impaired credit. Nontraditional mortgages encompassed a variety of risky mortgage products,
including option adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs"), interest-only mortgages, and reduced
documentation loans. Originally, these nontraditional products were offered primarily in the "Alt-A"
market to people with near-prime credit scores but intermittent or undocumented income sources.
Eventually, interest-only ARMs and reduced documentation loans penetrated the subprime market as
well. For a description of option ARMs and interest-only mortgages, see Patricia A. McCoy,
Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 123, 143-47 (2007).
5 Stated differently, the private-label market securitized mortgages were deemed
"nonconforming" because they did not qualify for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
Nonconforming mortgages include mortgages whose balances exceed those permitted for purchase by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and other mortgages that do not meet Fannie Mae's or Freddie Mac's
underwriting criteria.
6 Robert Stowe England, The Rise of Private Label, MORTGAGE BANKING (Oct. 2006),
http://www.robertstoweengland.com/documentsL/MM. 10-06EnglandPrivateLabel.pdf.
7 FREDDIE MAC UPDATE 18 (Jan. 2009), http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-
presentation.pdf.
8 We use the term "nonprime" to refer to subprime loans plus the Alt-A market. See supra note 4.
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Figure 1. Growth in Nontraditional Mortgages, 2002-20059
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The development of private-label securities differed from agency-
backed securities in two interrelated ways. First, unlike Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities ("MBS"), private-label MBS
were heterogeneous in their terms. This made trading in private-label
securities difficult and illiquid, with the consequence that rating agencies,
not markets, assessed the risk of private-label MBS.
Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed the credit risk of the
mortgage-backed securities that they issued. Thus, while Fannie/Freddie
agency securities bore prepayment risk, they did not bear credit risk and
were not priced or tranched for that risk. In contrast, private-label
securitizers did not issue guarantees of credit risk. Consequently, the
private-label market could and did pool nonconforming mortgages into
"tranches" that varied by credit risk. These private-label MBS, in turn,
were bundled into another type of mortgage security known as a
collateralized debt obligation, or "CDO," which was further differentiated
through the tranching of MBS by credit risk. Rating agencies presumed
that the senior tranches had virtually no credit risk while the junior
tranches had more credit risk and therefore higher expected rates of return,
with the "toxic tranches" carrying the most risk of all. In the end, of
course, even the top AAA private-label tranches, designated the safest by
9 FDIC Outlook: Breaking New Ground in U.S. Mortgage Lending (Summer 2006), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20062q/na/2006summer04.html.
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the rating agencies, carried substantial risk.'0
Capital markets' mortgage financing for risky borrowers was enabled
by technological change." One such change was securitization itself.
Another change consisted of automated underwriting, which calibrated the
default risk of individual borrowers-albeit in an increasing house price
regime, providing assurance (false, as we will see) that individual borrower
risk was limited. There was also a belief that economically based risk was
limited by geographical diversification, which was similarly misguided.
As the empirical and theoretical literature detail, the key determinant
of default and foreclosure risk is the loan amount-to-value ratio. 12 The
development of the private-label market for subprime and nontraditional
mortgages increased housing demand and home prices as well. But when
the easing of credit could go on no further, housing prices fell nationwide
starting in the last quarter of 2006.' Home prices plummeted so sharply
that, by the end of 2008, every sixth borrower owed more than his or her
home was worth. 14 As loan defaults soared, investors fled the private-label
securitization market and the subprime market collapsed. Ultimately, the
subprime crisis evolved into contagion that paralyzed credit markets
worldwide and triggered the deepest recession in the United States since
the Great Depression.
This is the systemic risk that securitization without regulation
engendered. This Article identifies the fundamental reasons why
securitization without regulation was unsustainable. The creation of
structured finance for mortgage credit risk abetted the rise of the subprime
market. But the market could not have developed without a regulatory
environment that enabled its growth. In a deregulated environment, capital
markets could and did have an appetite for almost any kind of risk,
presumably so long as sufficiently large yields were gained in exchange.
But the fundamental and inevitable failure of markets derived from the
lack of proper pricing of risk. As mortgages underlying securities became
more exposed to growing default risk, investors did not in fact receive
higher rates of return. In the end, many subprime loans had essentially no
underwriting. Default risk for subprime mortgages was neither calibrated,
'0 The concept was that the least risky tranche would very likely be paid off. In the end, however,
all tranches were risky. See Andrey D. Pavlov et al., Subprime Lending and Real Estate Markets, in
MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE FINANCE 325, 330-32 (Risk Books, 2008), for further discussion.
" For a description of these technological changes, see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy,
A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1273-
79 (2002).
12 For an overview of the literature, see U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOuNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-
194, MORTGAGE FINANCING: ACTIONS NEEDED TO HELP FHA MANAGE RISKS FROM NEW MORTGAGE
LOAN PRODUCTS 23-25 (2005).
13 Vikas Bajaj, Home Prices Fall in More Than Half of Nation's Biggest Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2007, at Cl.
14 Michael Corkery, Mortgage 'Cram-Downs' Loom as Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST. J., Dec.
31, 2008, at C1.
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reserved for, nor priced. Deregulation played a key determining role since
risk, while it existed and increased over time, was inescapably socialized in
the end (perhaps as anticipated by some market actors), as the realized
losses caused the global financial system to implode.
In Part II, we describe congressional legislation that deregulated
mortgages in the 1980s and provided the environment for the more recent
changes. In Part III, we describe the explosion of subprime and Alt-A
mortgages which followed. Part IV chronicles the federal and state
response to the manifest deterioration in underwriting standards and the
conscious inaction of federal banking regulators in the face of the
impending crisis. In Part V, we turn to a financial model which explains
why the implosion and financial crisis inevitably followed deregulation
and the absence of regulation. We conclude in Part VI with implications
for policy going forward.
II. DEREGULATION BY CONGRESS
Our story of deregulation dates back to 1980, when the United States
faced radically different economic challenges than today. In 1980,
inflation was out of control, interest rates on first mortgages were skirting
fourteen percent annually, and credit was increasingly tight in states with
strict usury caps. Concerned about a credit drought and the solvency of
thrift institutions, Congress passed two landmark pieces of legislation, one
in 1980 and one in 1982, which together deregulated residential mortgage
credit substantially in the United States. The credit crisis played out
against the backdrop of this legislation, which remains in effect.
In the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 ("DIDMCA"), Congress repealed all usury caps on first-lien
residential mortgages, including usury caps imposed by the states. 15 Two
years later, Congress deregulated home mortgages further by authorizing
adjustable rate mortgages, balloon clauses, and negative amortization loans
in the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 (the "Parity
Act"). 16 In language reminiscent of the rhetoric during the housing boom
of 2003-2006, industry commentators and regulators commended these
products for making homeownership affordable by allowing borrowers to
exchange lower initial monthly payments for higher payments on the back
end.
With the passage of these two laws, disclosure was the only remaining
federal mortgage regulation of any note. The federal Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"), passed in 1968, mandates uniform disclosures regarding cost for
15 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,
§§ 101-08, 94 Stat. 132, 132-41 (1980).
16 Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 801-07, 96 Stat.
1469, 1545-48 (1982).
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home loans. 17  Its companion law, the federal Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974 ("RESPA"), requires similar standardized
disclosures for settlement costs.' 8  Defects in both of these disclosure
schemes, however, rendered them largely ineffectual in promoting
informed comparison-shopping by consumers, especially for adjustable
rate mortgages and for borrowers in the yet to be developed subprime
market.19
After 1982, Congress turned its back on any further regulation of
residential mortgages, except for the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994 ("HOEPA").20 HOEPA was an early federal statute
that imposed product controls on home mortgages to curtail abuses in the
nascent subprime market. HOEPA had two important provisions. The
first consisted of HOEPA's high-cost loan provision,2' which regulated the
so-called high-cost refinance market and sought to eliminate abuses
consisting of "equity stripping." These provisions were hobbled, however,
by their extremely limited reach--covering only the most exorbitant
subprime mortgages-and their inapplicability to home purchase loans,
reverse mortgages, and open-end home equity lines of credit.22 Lenders
learned to evade the high-cost loan provisions rather easily by slightly
lowering the interest rates and fees on subprime loans below HOEPA's
thresholds and by expanding into subprime purchase loans.23
HOEPA also has a second major provision which gives the Federal
Reserve Board the authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive lending
practices and refinance loans involving practices that are abusive or against
the interest of the borrower.24 This provision was potentially broader than
the first because it allowed regulation of both the purchase and refinance
markets, without regard to interest rates or fees. Federal Reserve Board
chairman Alan Greenspan, however, declined to implement this
provision. It was only after defaults on subprime and other risky loans
ballooned into a full-blown crisis that Greenspan's successor, Ben
175 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2006).
182 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2006).
19 See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 4, at 138-47; Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The
Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25
YALE J. ON REG. 181, 207-17 (2008); see also Green & Wachter, The Housing Finance Revolution,
supra note 3, at 2.
20 5 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)-(b) (2006).
21 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa)(1H4) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(a)(1), (b)(1)(2006).
22 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(i), (w), (bb); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(2) (2006); EDWARD M. GRAMLICH,
SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA'S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 28 (Urban Institute Press, 2007).
23 See Gramlich, supra note 22, at 28. At the same time, they added features to lower risk to
lenders, such as prepayment risk penalties.
24 15 U.S.C. § 1639(/)(2) (2006).
25 See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 35, 37-38, 89 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
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Bernanke, promulgated a binding rule banning specific loan abuses-and
even then only for a limited group of loans-in July 2008.26 By then,
however, the nonconforming mortgage markets had collapsed and the
damage had been done.
In sum, two key federal statutes from the 1980s, the DIDMCA and the
Parity Act, dismantled the existing prohibitions against a variety of risky
loan features, including non-amortizing mortgages, negative amortization
mortgages, balloon clauses, and other interest rate structures creating high
potential payment shock. These two laws provided the deregulatory
environment in which interest-only loans and option ARMs later emerged.
At the same time, Congress did not temper the new deregulatory
environment with other types of prudential regulation, such as mandatory
underwriting criteria and documentation requirements, to ensure that
borrowers only received loans that they could afford and repay. The only
exceptions consisted of two provisions in HOEPA, enacted in 1994. Of
those two provisions, the high-cost loan provision had extremely narrow
coverage and was easily evaded. The other provision, governing unfair
and deceptive acts and practices, was potentially broader. This provision
remained unused during the run-up to the credit crisis as the market
evolved to enable the borrowing of sums that could not be repaid. Former
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan was opposed to limiting
financial "innovation." Meanwhile, the George W. Bush Administration
opposed legislation on Capitol Hill that was offered to regulate and limit
risk in the subprime market while failing to propose constructive
legislation of its own. These omissions by Congress, the Federal Reserve,
and the Executive Branch set the stage for what followed.
III. RACE TO THE BOTTOM: THE AFTERMATH OF TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION AND DEREGULATION
This initial deregulation was a necessary condition for the emergence
of a critical mass of imprudent mortgages, but it was not sufficient. The
mortgage industry itself was undergoing structural change in its financing
mechanism that made it possible for mortgage professionals to sell
products with heightened risk and to "disperse" that risk among investors
at large.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the U.S. developed a
mortgage system which was described in the movie, "It's a Wonderful
Life"; home mortgage loans were funded by bank deposits and made by
local institutions to borrowers whom the bank knew personally. That all
changed in the 1980s, due to the savings and loan crisis, which in fact had
similarities to today's debacle:
26 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
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The ignition of inflation in the late 1960s and 1970s altered
the ability of depositories to fund long term, fixed rate
mortgages: inflation pushed up nominal interest rates and
required higher returns on deposits while asset returns were
fixed at the low levels of historical fixed rates on long term
mortgages which made up most of the thrift industry
portfolios. Inadequately capitalized depository institutions
(S&Ls) then advanced unsustainable commercial mortgages.
Because these institutions often had no equity to protect, their
managers had large incentives to make high-risk loans. If the
loans failed, the institutions and their depositors were no
worse off. If they paid off, however, the institution would
return to solvency. Because S&Ls were not required to mark
their assets to market, they were able to hide their distress
until loans began defaulting. This points to the general issue,
which we will return to, of the signaling power of price
discovery in capital markets.
Congress and the Bush Administration bit the bullet by
passing the Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989; this legislation liquidated insolvent
Savings and Loans, and turned their assets over to the
Resolution Trust Corporation, whose function was the
disposition of the assets; cash raised from the sales were used
to off-set the costs of the S&L failure to US taxpayers. At
the same time thrift portfolios were restructured by
exchanging below market mortgages for MBS that could be
sold and the losses amortized rather than realized
immediately. Thrifts solved their asset liability mismatch by
selling fixed rate mortgages into the secondary market for
securitization by MBS underwritten by one of the US
secondary market agencies.27
Going forward, thrifts held adjustable rate mortgages in portfolio and
securitized fixed rate mortgages underwritten by the GSEs. The market for
the latter grew and specialized as it grew. Mortgage distributors began to
specialize among originators, investors, and servicers. Advancement in
technology pushed mortgage evolution further. Freddie Mac introduced
automated underwriting, which was implemented by both GSEs and other
large lenders for prime borrowers. By the late 1980s and 1990s,
27 Richard Green et al., Misaligned Incentives and Mortgage Lending in Asia 6-7 (Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-27, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-=1287687#.
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underwriting and risk assessment had improved greatly as pools of
mortgages could be studied and default indicators could be better analyzed.
But while the algorithms for rationing credit became
sophisticated, the algorithms for pricing subprime mortgages
(to the extent such things even exist) faced a serious
identification problem. From the period 1997 to 2005, the
period in which the subprime market grew dramatically,
nominal house prices in the United States rose rapidly and
nearly ubiquitously. This meant that the incentive to default
was extremely low-households had a strong incentive to sell
their houses and preserve their equity rather than default.28
Automated underwriting and diversified pools did limit risk for a time,
but of course could not prevent systemic risk. The expansion of lending
without risk controls that was to follow increased prices unsustainably and
promoted loans that could not be repaid. Eventually, lenders believed their
ability to assess risk of loans was so good that they created ever more
complicated mortgage instruments with different and complicated metrics
of default risk pricing. The result was the nontraditional lending
instruments of the past decade such as option ARMs, interest-only ARMs,
and no-documentation loans.
As debt instruments became more complex and the population of
borrowers grew, so too did the balance of leverage in the United States.
Between 1975 and 2007, the U.S. Government's gross debt as a percentage
of gross domestic product ("GDP") had gone from forty to fifty-three
percent; the debt of nonfinancial companies as a percentage of GDP went
from fifty-three to seventy-six percent. However, the ratio of household
debt to GDP went from around forty-three to near one hundred percent,
while the ratio of financial company debt to GDP went from sixteen to one
hundred and sixteen percent, indicating an explosion of credit, particularly
in housing and financial institutions. (See Figure 2.)
28 Green & Wachter, The Housing Finance Revolution, supra note 3, at 37.
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Figure 2. Rising Leverage Levels by Sector, 1975 to 2007
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This leveraging in the consumer and financial sectors had been enabled
by the evolution of nontraditional lending products. Between the end of
2001 and 2006, nontraditional lending instruments such as option ARMs
offering negative amortization and interest-only mortgages with non-
amortizing features went from under five percent of all nonprime
originations to over fifty percent. (See Figure 1.) Also, for Alt-A and
subprime loans, while credit scores of borrowers remained relatively
unchanged between 2002 and 2006, two default indicators increased
substantially: loan-to-value ratios and the percentage of originations
exceeding eighty percent of combined loan-to-value ratios. At the same
time, the spreads of rates over the bank cost of capital tightened. To make
matters worse, a layering of risks occurred, with borrowers who were the
most at risk obtaining low equity, no-amortization, reduced documentation
loans. (See Figure 3.)
[Vol. 41:1327
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Figure 3. Underwriting Criteria for Adjustable Rate Mortgages, 2002-2006
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Many of these risky mortgage instruments were made in areas where
housing was least affordable, such as California, Florida and Arizona,
leading to concentrated areas of unsustainable housing values. (See
Figures 4 and 5.) Such concentration of risky loans puts the entire local
markets at risk, above and beyond a potential change in the fundamental
demand for real estate, due to the sharp, sudden and extreme withdrawal of
credit in the aftermath of a bubble.29
29 See Pavlov et al., supra note 10, at 332-35.
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Figure 4. Geographic Distribution of Interest-Only Loans, 2006.30
Interest-Only (%) in 2006
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preater than 757% to 100%
30 Anthony Pennington-Cross, Mortgage Product Substitution and State Predatory Lending Laws,
Presentation at the 2008 Mid-Year Meeting of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association, Washington, D.C., May 27, 2008.
[Vol. 41:1327
SYSTEMIC RISK THROUGH SECURITIZA TION 13
Figure 5. Geographic Distribution of Low-Documentation Loans, 200631
LowDocumentation (%) in 2006
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The combination of easing credit standards and a growing economy
resulted in a sharp increase in homeownership rates through 2004. As the
credit quality of loans steadily grew worse from 2005 through 2007,32
however, the volume of unsustainable loans grew and homeownership
rates dropped.33
31 Anthony Pennington-Cross, Mortgage Product Substitution and State Predatory Lending Laws,
Presentation at the 2008 Mid-Year Meeting of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association, Washington, D.C., May 27, 2008.
32 Subprime mortgages originated in 2005, 2006, and 2007 had successively worse default
experiences than vintages in prior years. See FREDDIE MAC, supra note 7, at 19.
33 See Jesse M. Abraham et al., Explaining the United States' Uniquely Bad Housing Market 24
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-34, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract - 1320197; see also infra Table 1.
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Table 1. U.S. Homeownership Rates, by Year34
U.S. Total,
Period % Non-Hispanic, % Hispanic%
White Black Other race Two or
Alone Alone alone more races
1983 64.9 69.1 45.6 53.3 NA 41.2
1984 64.5 69 46 50.9 NA 40.1
1985 64.3 69 44.4 50.7 NA 41.1
1986 63.8 68.4 44.8 49.7 NA 40.6
1987 64 68.7 45.8 48.7 NA 40.6
1988 64 69.1 42.9 49.7 NA 40.6
1989 64 69.3 42.1 50.6 NA 41.6
1990 64.1 69.4 42.6 49.2 NA 41.2
1991 64 69.5 42.7 51.3 NA 39.0
1992 64.1 69.6 42.6 52.5 NA 39.9
1993 64.1 70.2 42 50.6 NA 39.4
1994 64 70 42.5 50.8 NA 41.2
1995 64.7 70.9 42.9 51.5 NA 42.0
1996 65.4 71.7 44.5 51.5 NA 42.8
1997 65.7 72 45.4 53.3 NA 43.3
1998 66.3 72.6 46.1 53.7 NA 44.7
1999 66.8 73.2 46.7 54.1 NA 45.5
2000 67.4 73.8 47.6 53.9 NA 46.3
2001 67.8 74.3 48.4 54.7 NA 47.3
2002 67.9 74.7 48.2 55 NA 47.0
2003 68.3 75.4 48.8 56.7 58 46.7
2004 69 76 49.7 59.6 60.4 48.1
2005 68.9 75.8 48.8 60.4 59.8 49.5
2006 68.8 75.8 48.4 61.1 59.9 49.7
2007 68.1 75.2 47.8 60.3 59 49.7
The timing of the explosion of nontraditional mortgage lending is also
of interest. The major take-off in these products occurred in 2002, which
coincided with the winding down of the huge increase in demand for
mortgage securities through the refinance process. Coming out of the
recession of 2001, interest rates fell and a massive securitization boom
occurred through refinancing that was fueled by low interest rates. The
private-label securitization industry had grown in capacity and profits. But
3 Authors' compilation of data located in the Historical Census of Housing Tables, U.S. Census
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html.
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in 2003, rising interest rates ended the potential for refinancing at ever-
lower interest rates, leading to an increased need for another source of
mortgages to maintain and grow the rate of securitization and the fees it
generated. The "solution" was the expansion of the market through
nontraditional mortgages. In 2002, interest-only loans were under five
percent of nonprime originations compared to over twenty-five percent in
2005. The share of negative amortization loans also grew during this
period from near zero to over twenty percent of the market. (See Figure 1.)
This expansion of credit swept a larger portion of the population into the
potential homeowner pool, driving up housing demand and prices, and
consumer indebtedness. (See Figure 2.)
The growth in nonprime mortgages was accomplished through market
expansion enabled by nontraditional mortgages and by qualifying more
borrowing through easing of traditional lending terms. For example, while
subprime mortgages were initially made as "hard money" loans with low
loan-to-value ratios, by the height of their growth, combined loan-to-value
ratios exceeded that of the far less risky prime market. (See Figure 3.)
While the demand for riskier mortgages grew fueled by the need for
product to securitize, the potential risk due to the unsustainability of the
eroded lending standards also grew.
IV. REGULATORY FAILURE
Deregulation, in the face of a massively changing mortgage market,
was a pervasive characteristic of the lending environment of the past
decade and earlier. Congress laid the cornerstone for risk based pricing of
mortgages through the twin legislation passed in 1980 and 1982 removing
usury caps and deregulating loan products. Later, at the turn of the century
in 1999 and 2000, Congress did not respond to the proliferation of
systemic risk as overall lending became riskier. Moreover, Congress
precluded the states from requiring mandatory reserving for credit default
swaps issued by insurance companies and other entities which could have
unveiled systemic risk. Thus left unregulated, credit default swaps turned
into a major vector of global contagion during the recent credit crisis.
Federal regulators also played a crucial role in forging a deregulatory
climate that allowed reckless loans to flourish. Repeatedly, federal
banking regulators 35 refused to exercise their substantial powers of rule-
making, formal enforcement, and sanctions to crack down on the
proliferation of poorly underwritten loans. In the meantime, in 2004, the
35 The four federal banking regulators include: the Federal Reserve System, which serves as the
central bank and supervises state member banks; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which
oversees national banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which operates the Deposit
Insurance Fund and regulates state nonmember banks; and the Office of Thrift Supervision, which
supervises savings associations.
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Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") allowed the largest U.S.
investment firms to increase their leverage to 40 to 1, to voluntarily
compute their capital levels, and to decrease the level of oversight by the
SEC. Together, the combined record of regulatory abdication helped
improvident loans flourish and boosted the demand for those loans by the
investment banks that securitized them.
A. Residential Mortgage Origination Market
Federal regulators and the states were not powerless to stop the
deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards that started in 2002 and
later accelerated. To the contrary, when Congress deregulated residential
mortgages in 1980, it preserved the longstanding authority of federal
banking regulators and the states to prohibit reckless underwriting through
binding regulations and unilateral, formal enforcement actions. Starting in
1999, a majority of the states enacted laws designed to curb imprudent
underwriting of subprime loans. Federal banking regulators, however,
openly and repeatedly refused to intervene in disastrous lending practices
until it was too late. The onus was on federal regulators to act because two
of those federal regulators had mounted an aggressive and successful
preemption campaign to exempt lenders under their jurisdiction-
accounting for approximately half of all subprime originations-from the
state laws. Those federally regulated lenders-and all lenders operating in
states with weak regulation-were thereby given carte blanche to loosen
their lending standards without regulatory intervention.
1. The Federal Reserve Board
Our story begins with the Federal Reserve Board (the "Fed"), which
had the statutory power, starting in 1994, to curb lax lending not only for
depository institutions, but for all lenders across-the-board. It declined to
exercise that power in any meaningful respect, however, until -after the
nonprime mortgage market collapsed. Part of the fault lies with the Fed's
supervisory process and part of it is due to the Fed's ideological blinders to
needed regulatory reforms.
The Fed's supervisory process has three major parts and breakdowns
are apparent in two out of the three. The part that appeared to work well
was the Fed's role as the primary federal regulator for state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System.36 In general, these
are rather small community banks. In 2007 and 2008, only one failed
bank-the tiny First Georgia Community Bank in Jackson, Georgia, with
36 Throughout this Article, the data discussed regarding failed and near-failed banks and thrifts
come from: federal bank regulatory and SEC statistics, disclosures, press releases, and orders; rating
agency reports; press releases and other web materials by the companies mentioned; statistics compiled
by the American Banker, and financial press reports.
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only $237.5 million in assets-was regulated by the Federal Reserve
System. It is not clear whether the Fed's excellent performance in this
regard is explained by the strength of its examination process, the limited
role of member banks in risky lending, the fact that state banks had to
comply with state anti-predatory lending laws, 37 or all three.
As the second part of its supervisory duties, the Fed regulates nonbank
mortgage lenders owned by bank holding companies but not owned
directly or indirectly by banks or thrifts. During the subprime boom, some
of the largest subprime and Alt-A lenders were regulated by the Fed,
including the top- and third-ranked subprime lenders in 2006, HSBC
Finance and Countrywide Financial Corporation.38 The Fed's supervisory
record with regard to these lenders was mixed. On one notable occasion,
in 2004, the Fed levied a $70 million civil money penalty against
CitiFinancial Credit Company and its parent holding company, Citigroup
Inc., for subprime lending abuses.39 Otherwise, the Fed did not take public
enforcement action for lax underwriting of home mortgages against the
nonbank lenders it regulated between 2003 and 2007. This may be
because the Federal Reserve did not routinely examine the nonbank
mortgage lending subsidiaries under its supervision, which the late Federal
Reserve Board Governor Edward Gramlich revealed in 2007.40
Finally, the Fed regulates bank holding companies. In the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 ("Gramm-Leach-Bliley"), Congress created a
new type of expanded bank holding company-known as a financial
holding company-that can own full-service investment banks and
insurance underwriters in addition to banks. In Gramm-Leach-Bliley,
Congress designated the Federal Reserve as the super-regulator for the new
financial holding companies and charged it with supervising the
significantly higher concentrated risks that financial conglomerates pose.
In so doing, however, Congress tied the Federal Reserve's hands in three
significant respects. First, Congress instructed the Fed to focus holding
company examinations on the holding company itself.4' Second, Congress
" See infra Section IV.A.2 (discussing state anti-predatory lending laws).
38 Data provided by AM. BANKER, available at www.americanbanker.com.
39 Citigroup Inc. and CitiFinancial Credit Company, Order to Cease and Desist and Order of
Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon Consent 3 (May 27, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/PRESS/enforcement2004/20040527/attachment.pdf.
40 Edward M. Gramlich, Speech at the Housing, Housing Finance & Monetary Policy Symposium
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: Boom and Busts, The Case of Subprime Mortgages 8-9
(Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2007/pdf/ 2 0 0 7 .0 9 .0 4 .
gramlich.pdf
41 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(C)
(2006). Under this provision, the Fed is supposed to examine nonbank subsidiaries only to the extent
that they could have a materially adverse effect on the safety and soundness of any bank or thrift
affiliate due to its size, condition or activities or the nature or size of its transactions with the bank or
thrift. The Fed did not deem this a barrier to regulation, however, because in a "pilot project" begun in
July 2007, the Fed announced plans to examine the nonbank mortgage lenders of bank holding
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told the Fed to rely on bank and thrift examination reports by other state
and federal banking regulators to the fullest extent possible in lieu of
examining those institutions itself.4 2 Finally, Congress curtailed the Fed's
ability to examine an investment bank or insurance underwriting subsidiary
of a financial holding company except in three limited circumstances.43
Otherwise, the Board must rely on examination reports by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, state securities regulators, or state insurance
regulators.44 In the process, Congress hamstrung the Fed by asking it to
supervise the systemic risk posed by financial holding companies without
giving it the examination capabilities or full information needed to carry
out that role.45
As for the Fed's ideological blinders, the Board had the statutory
power to impose significant underwriting controls on depository and
nonbank lenders alike, but declined to exercise that power until it was too
late. This power consisted of the Fed's statutory authority under the unfair
and deceptive acts and practices provision of HOEPA to crack down on lax
underwriting and consumer abuses through regulations with universal
coverage. When he served on the Fed, the late Governor Edward Gramlich
urged then-Chairman Alan Greenspan to exercise the Fed's power to
address unfair and deceptive loans under HOEPA. Greenspan refused,
preferring instead to rely on non-binding statements and guidances.46 This
reliance on statements and guidances had two disadvantages: one, major
companies to "evaluate" their "underwriting practices." Federal Reserve Board, "Federal and State
Agencies Announce Pilot Project to Improve Supervision of Subprime Mortgage Lenders" (press
release July 17, 2007).
42 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(D).
43 First, the Fed may initiate an examination if it has reasonable cause to believe that the
subsidiary is engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated depository institution. Id. §
1844(c)(2)(B)(i). Second, the Board may conduct an examination if it reasonably determines, after
reviewing relevant reports, that an examination is necessary to assess the subsidiary's systems for
monitoring and controlling financial and operational risks to its bank and thrift affiliates. Id. §
1844(c)(2)(B)(ii). Finally, an examination may go forward if the Board, based on reports and other
available information, has reasonable cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in compliance with any
federal law that is within the Board's specific jurisdiction (including restrictions on interaffiliate
transactions) when the Board cannot make that determination through examination of the bank or thrift
affiliate or the parent holding company. Id. § 1844(c)(2)(B)(iii).
4Id. § l844(c)(2)(E).
45 See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back Unswayed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2008, at Al.
46 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 35, 37-38 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve). Greenspan told the House Oversight Committee in 2008:
Well, let's take the issue of unfair and deceptive practices, which is a
fundamental concept to the whole predatory lending issue. The staff of the Federal
Reserve ... says how do they determine as a regulatory group what is unfair and
deceptive? And the problem that they were concluding... was the issue of maybe
10 percent or so are self-evidently unfair and deceptive, but the vast majority would
require a jury trial or other means to deal with it....
Id. at 89.
[Vol. 41:1327
SYSTEMIC RISK THROUGH SECURITIZATION
lenders routinely dismissed the guidances as mere "suggestions," and two,
guidances did not apply to independent nonbank mortgage lenders.
The Federal Reserve did not relent until July 2008 when, under
Chairman Ben Bernanke's leadership, it finally promulgated binding
HOEPA regulations banning specific types of lax and abusive loans. Even
then, the regulations were mostly limited to higher-priced mortgages,
which the Board confined to first-lien loans of 1.5 percentage points or
more above the average prime offer rate for a comparable transaction, and
3.5 percentage points or more above for second-lien loans. Although
shoddy nontraditional mortgages below those triggers had also contributed
to the credit crisis, the rule left those loans-plus prime loans-mostly
untouched.47
The rules, while badly needed, were too little and too late. On October
23, 2008, in testimony before the House of Representatives Oversight
Committee, Greenspan admitted that "those of us who have looked to the
self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders [sic] equity,
myself especially, are in a state of shocked disbelief.' '4 8 House Oversight
Committee Chairman Henry Waxman asked Greenspan whether "your
ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not
made?"A9 Greenspan replied:
Mr. GREENSPAN. ... [Y]es, I found a flaw, I don't
know how significant or permanent it is, but I have been very
distressed by that fact.
Chairman WAXMAN. You found a flaw?
Mr. GREENSPAN. I found a flaw in the model that...
defines how the world works, so to speak.
Chairman WAXMAN. In other words, you found that
your view of the world, your ideology, was not right, it was
not working.
Mr. GREENSPAN. Precisely. That's precisely the
reason I was shocked, because I had been going for 40 years
or more with very considerable evidence that it was working
exceptionally well.50
47 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522-23 (July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The
Board set those triggers with the intention of covering the subprime market, but not the prime market.
See id. at 44,536 (noting the Board's "stated objective of excluding the prime market").
4S The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, I10th Cong. 17 (2008) (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081024163819.pdf.49 Id. at 36.
'
0 Id. at 36-37.
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2. Re-Regulation by the States and Federal Obstruction
During the long hiatus through which the Federal Reserve Board
refused to regulate unfair and deceptive mortgage practices, many of the
states took action of their own. Despite HOEPA's passage in 1994, it
became increasingly evident that HOEPA was incapable of halting equity
stripping and other sorts of subprime abuses. By the late 1990s, some
cities and states were contending with rising foreclosures and
contemplating regulating subprime loans on their own. Notwithstanding
the 1980s federal legislation deregulating mortgages, Congress had
preserved discretion for the states to regulate home mortgages, so long as
they did not impose usury caps or prohibit alternative mortgage products
outright.
Many states already had older statutes on the books regulating
prepayment penalties and occasionally balloon clauses. These laws were
relatively narrow, however, and did not address other types of new abuses
that were surfacing in subprime loans. Consequently, in 1999, North
Carolina became the first state to address the larger problem by enacting a
comprehensive anti-predatory lending law.5' Soon, other states followed
suit and passed anti-predatory lending laws of their own. These newer
state laws implemented HOEPA's design but frequently had expanded
coverage or imposed stricter regulation on subprime loans. By the end of
2005, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had enacted one of
these "mini-HOEPA" laws. Some states also had passed stricter disclosure
laws or laws regulating mortgage brokers. As of January 1, 2007, only six
states-Arizona, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and South
Dakota-lacked laws regulating prepayment penalties, balloon clauses, or
mandatory arbitration clauses, all of which are associated with exploitative
subprime loans. 2
The states that enacted anti-predatory lending laws did not legislate in
a vacuum, however. Here, a bit of history is in order. In 1996, the federal
regulator for thrift institutions-the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS")--promulgated a sweeping preemption rule declaring that
henceforth federal savings associations did not have to observe state
lending laws.53 Initially, this rule had little practical effect because any
state anti-predatory lending provisions on the books then were fairly
narrow.
54
51 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1. I E (2000).
52 Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal
Enforcement Mechanisms, 60 J. ECON. & Bus. 47, 49 (2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstract id=1005423.
13 12 C.F.R. §§-559.3(h), 560.2(a) (2008).
54 See Bostic et al., supra note 52, at 49 (noting that states only began enacting "mini-HOEPA"
laws in 1999).
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Following adoption of the OTS preemption rule, federal thrift
institutions were relieved from having to comply with state consumer
protection laws. That was not true, however, for national banks, state
banks, state thrifts, and independent nonbank mortgage lenders and
brokers. The stakes rose considerably starting in 1999, once North
Carolina passed its anti-predatory lending law. As state mini-HOEPA laws
proliferated, national banks lobbied their regulator-a federal agency
known as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")-to
clothe them with the same federal preemption as federal savings
associations. They succeeded and, in 2004, the OCC issued its own
preemption rule banning the states from enforcing their laws impinging on
real estate lending by national banks and their subsidiaries. 55
OTS and the OCC had institutional motives to grant federal
preemption to the institutions that they regulated. Both agencies depend
almost exclusively on fees from their regulated entities for their operating
budgets. Both were also eager to persuade state-chartered depository
institutions to convert to a federal charter. In addition, the OCC was aware
that if national banks wanted federal preemption badly enough, they might
defect to the thrift charter to get it. Thus, the OCC had reason to placate
national banks to keep them in its fold. Similarly, the OTS was concerned
about the steady decline in thrift institutions. Federal preemption provided
an inducement to thrift institutions to retain the federal savings association
charter.
Agency turf wars were not the only motivation at work.
Concomitantly, OCC regulators and their federal bank regulator
counterparts were true believers in the ability of market structures and new
instruments to contain risk. When market innovations could contain risk,
the thinking went, why have government regulation? Federal regulators
extolled credit derivatives, including credit default swaps, for their ability
to hedge default risk on loans. They embraced securitization as a way for
depository institutions to make fees while pushing credit risk and interest
rate risk off of their books. And, in a case of exceptionally poor timing,
federal banking regulators changed the risk-based capital rules to allow the
largest, internationally active depository institutions to compute their
minimum capital requirements themselves, using a statistical model known
as "Value-at-Risk" or "VaR.",56 Regulators adopted this change in
5 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7);
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34). National City Corporation, the parent of National City Bank, N.A.,
and a major subprime lender, spearheaded the campaign for OCC preemption. Editorial, Predatory
Lending Laws Neutered, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 6, 2003, at 10A.
56 See Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at MM24 (stating that "there
has been a great deal of talk .. .that this widespread institutional reliance on VaR was a terrible
mistake").
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December 2007, just as the VaR model was becoming discredited for
failing to anticipate the subprime crisis. Tragically, taken together these
techniques encouraged a silo mentality in which federal banking regulators
ignored heightened risks so long as banks and thrifts were able to shift
those risks to other market participants outside of the banking system.
The OTS rule occasioned relatively little outburst when it was adopted.
In contrast, there was pronounced public outcry over the OCC rule, coming
as it did during the George W. Bush administration, which was hostile to
attempts to regulate mortgages. For decades, it had been assumed that
states regulated consumer protection at national banks. The OCC rule
overrode that tradition by blocking the states' ability to protect their
citizens from consumer protection violations by national banks. The OCC
rule even extended federal preemption to national bank subsidiaries that
were state-chartered nonbank mortgage lenders. In a companion rule,
moreover, the OCC denied permission to the states to enforce their own
laws that were not federally preempted-state lending discrimination laws
as just one example-against national banks and their subsidiaries. After a
protracted court battle, the controversy ended up in the U.S. Supreme
Court, which upheld the OCC preemption rule in its entirety.57
Federal preemption might not have devolved into regulatory failure
had OTS and the OCC replaced state regulation with a comprehensive set
of binding rules prohibiting lax underwriting of home mortgages. The
OCC did adopt one rule in 2004 prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and
practices and mortgages made without regard to the borrower's ability to
repay, but the vagueness of that rule made it easy to evade. OTS replaced
binding rules by the states with no rules at all. In lieu of binding rules,
federal banking regulators, including the OCC and OTS, issued a series of
advisory letters and guidelines against predatory or unfair mortgage
lending practices by insured depository institutions. 8 Federal regulators
57 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007). See generally Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious
Threat to the Dual Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FINANCE L. 225 (2004). The Watters
case only upheld OCC preemption. Later, in January 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a
challenge to the OCC visitorial powers rule by Andrew Cuomo, the Attorney General of New York.
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n et al., 129 S.Ct. 987 (U.S. 2009).
The OCC and the OTS lefit some areas of state law untouched, namely, state criminal law and
state law regulating contracts, torts, homestead rights, debt collection, property, taxation, and zoning.
Both agencies, though, reserved the right to declare that any state laws in those areas are preempted in
the future. For fuller discussion, see Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure
of Subprime and Nontraditional Mortgage Lending, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND
MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008), full working paper
version available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding_consumercredit
/papers/ucc08-5_mccoyrenuart.pdf).
58 E.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Guidelines for National Banks to Guard
Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices, Advisory Letter 2003-2 (Feb. 21, 2003), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans, Advisory Letter
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disavowed binding rules during the run-up to the subprime crisis on
grounds that the guidelines were more flexible and that the agencies
enforced those guidelines through bank examinations and informal
enforcement actions.59 Informal enforcement actions are limited to
negotiated, voluntary agreements between regulators and the entities that
they supervise, making it easy for management to drag out negotiations to
soften any restrictions and to bid for more time. Furthermore,
examinations and informal enforcement are highly confidential, making it
easy for lax regulators to hide their tracks.
3. Effectiveness of OTS and OCC Oversight
Regulatory inaction can be difficult to prove, particularly if it is
shrouded in the guise of confidential procedures such as bank examinations
and informal supervisory proceedings. In the wake of the subprime crisis,
however, federal securities filings, static pool reports, and the failure and
near-failure of a host of insured depository institutions provided insight
into regulatory lapses by the OCC and OTS.
a. The Office of Thrift Supervision
Although OTS was the first agency to adopt federal preemption, it
managed to fly under the radar during the subprime boom, overshadowed
by its larger sister agency, the OCC. After 2003, while commentators were
busy berating the OCC preemption rule, OTS allowed the largest federal
savings associations to embark on an aggressive campaign of expansion
through option adjustable rate mortgages, subprime loans, and low-
documentation and no-documentation loans.
Autopsies of failed depository institutions in 2007 and 2008 show that
five of the seven biggest failures were OTS-regulated thrifts. Two other
enormous thrifts during that period-Wachovia Mortgage, FSB and
Countrywide Bank, FSB6° -were forced to arrange hasty takeovers by
better capitalized bank holding companies to avoid failing. By December
31, 2008, thrifts totaling $355 billion in assets had failed in the previous
sixteen months on OTS' watch.6'
The reasons for the collapse of these thrifts evidence fundamental
regulatory lapses by OTS. Almost all of the thrifts that failed in 2007 and
2008-and all of the larger ones-succumbed to massive levels of
2003-3 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-3.pdf; OCC
Guidelines Establishing Standards for Residential Mortgage Lending Practices, 70 Fed. Reg. 6329
(Feb. 7, 2005) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30).
59 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate
Lending and Appraisals; Final Rule, 69 FED. REG. 1904 (2004).
60 Countrywide Bank converted from a national bank charter to a federal thrift charter in March
2007 in a quest for laxer OTS regulation. Binyamin Appelbaum and Ellen Nakashima, Regulator
Played Advocate Over Enforcer, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 23, 2008.
61 Id.
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imprudent home loans. IndyMac Bank, FSB, which became the first major
thrift institution to fail during the current crisis in July 2008, manufactured
its demise by becoming the nation's top originator of low-documentation
and no-documentation loans. These loans, which became known as "liars'
loans," infected both the subprime market and credit to borrowers with
higher credit scores. Low-documentation, or stated income, loans
dispensed with verifying the borrower's employment and income. No-
documentation loans were made without inquiry as to the borrower's
employment or income. By 2006 and 2007, over half of IndyMac's home
purchase loans were subprime loans and IndyMac Bank approved up to
half of those loans based on low or no documentation.
Washington Mutual Bank, popularly known as "WaMu," was the
nation's largest thrift institution in 2008, with over $300 billion in assets.
On September 25, 2008, WaMu became the biggest U.S. depository
institution in history to fail, collapsing in the wake of the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy. 62 WaMu was so large that OTS examiners were stationed
permanently onsite.63 Nevertheless, from 2004 through 2006, despite the
daily presence of the resident OTS inspectors, risky option ARMs, second
mortgages, and subprime loans constituted over half of WaMu's real estate
loans each year. By June 30, 2008, over one-fourth of the subprime loans
that WaMu originated in 2006 and 2007 were at least thirty days past due.
Eventually, it came to light that WaMu's management had pressured its
loan underwriters relentlessly to approve more and more exceptions to
WaMu's underwriting standards in order to increase its fee revenue from
loans.64
Downey Savings & Loan became the third largest depository
institution to fail in 2008. Like WaMu, Downey had loaded up on option
ARMs and subprime loans. When OTS finally had to put it into
receivership, over half of Downey's total assets consisted of option ARMs
and nonperforming loans accounted for over fifteen percent of the thrift's
total assets.65
In short, the three largest depository institution failures in 2007 and
2008 that stemmed from the subprime crisis resulted from high
concentrations of poorly underwritten loans, including low- and no-
documentation ARMs (in the case of IndyMac) and option ARMs (in the
62 Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, US. Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al.
63 See Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 60 (noting that OTS examiners worked full-time at
Washington Mutual's headquarters).
64 See Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone, WaMu Built Empire on
Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at Al (describing pressure upon Washington Mutual Bank
loan underwriters to approve loans using lax lending standards).
65 Dan Fitzpatrick & Damian Paletta, Crisis on Wall Street: Three Banks Fail in a Single Day--
California Thrifts, Georgia Bank Succumb; US. Bancorp Buys Some Deposits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
2008, at C2.
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case of WaMu and Downey) that were often only underwritten to the
introductory rate instead of the fully indexed rate.66 During the housing
bubble, OTS issued no binding rules to halt the proliferation by its largest
regulated thrifts of option ARMs, subprime loans, and low- and no-
documentation mortgages. Instead, OTS relied on recommendations
issued in the form of guidances. IndyMac, WaMu, and Downey apparently
treated the guidances as solely advisory, however, as evidenced by the fact
that all three made substantial numbers of hazardous loans in late 2006 and
2007 in direct disregard of an interagency guidance on nontraditional
mortgages issued in the fall of 2006 and subscribed to by OTS that
prescribed underwriting ARMs to the fully indexed rate.67
The fact that the three institutions continued to make loans in violation
of the guidance suggests that OTS examinations failed to enforce the
guidance. Similarly, OTS fact sheets on the failures of all three institutions
show that the agency consistently declined to institute timely formal
enforcement proceedings against those thrifts prohibiting the lending
practices that resulted in their demise. In sum, OTS supervision of
residential mortgage risks was confined to "light touch" regulation in the
form of examinations, nonbinding guidances, and occasional informal
agreements that ultimately failed to work.
b. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
A similar form of "light touch" regulation was apparent at the OCC.
Arguably, the OCC was somewhat more proactive than OTS because it did
promulgate one rule, in 2004, prohibiting mortgages to borrowers who
could not afford to repay.68 However, the rule was vague both in design
and execution, allowing lax lending to proliferate at national banks and
their mortgage lending subsidiaries through 2007.
Despite the 2004 rule, through 2007, large national banks continued to
make large quantities of low- and no-documentation loans and subprime
ARMs that were solely underwritten to the introductory rate. In 2006, for
example, fully 62.6% of the first-lien home purchase mortgages made by
66 Almost always during the housing boom, the introductory rate on subprime and nontraditional
ARMs was lower-in some cases, substantially lower---than the fully indexed rate. When the
introductory period expired and the ARM adjusted upward to the fully indexed rate, the monthly
payment could increase overnight by 20% to 100% or more, depending on the type of product and
interest rate movements. This payment shock was especially severe for option ARMs and only slightly
less severe for interest-only ARMs. Lenders who qualified loan applicants at the introductory rate, not
the fully indexed rate, substantially increased the risk of default because many borrowers could not
afford the increased payments upon loan reset. See, e.g., Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional
Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,613-14 (Oct. 4, 2006) (describing the potential
payment shock on nontraditional ARMs).
67 See id at 58,609 (providing background information on the increased number of institutions
that offered nontraditional mortgage products).
" See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1,904,
1,911 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) (intending to prevent asset-based loans).
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National City Bank, N.A., and its subsidiary, First Franklin Mortgage,
were higher-priced subprime loans. 69 Starting in the third quarter of 2007,
National City Bank reported five straight quarters of net losses, largely due
to those subprime loans. Just as with WaMu, the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy ignited a silent run by depositors and pushed National City
Bank to the brink of collapse. Only a shotgun marriage with PNC
Financial Services Group in October 2008 saved National City Bank from
FDIC receivership.7°
The five largest U.S. banks in 2005, which were all national banks,
likewise made heavy inroads into low- and no-documentation loans. The
top-ranked Bank of America, N.A., had a thriving stated-income and no-
documentation loan program, which it only halted in August 2007, when
the market for private-label mortgage-backed securities dried up. Bank of
America securitized most of those loans, which may explain why the OCC
tolerated such lax underwriting practices. Similarly, in 2006, the OCC
overrode public protests about a "substantial volume" of no-documentation
loans by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the second largest bank in 2005, on
grounds that the bank had adequate "checks and balances" in place to
manage those loans.
Citibank, N.A., was the third largest U.S. bank in 2005. In September
2007, the OCC approved Citibank's purchase of the disreputable subprime
lender Argent Mortgage, even though subprime securitizations had slowed
to a trickle. Citibank thereupon announced to the press that its new
subsidiary--christened "Citi Residential Lending"-would specialize in
nonprime loans, including reduced documentation loans. But not long
after, in early May 2008 after Bear Steams narrowly escaped failure,
Citibank was forced to admit defeat and dismantle Citi Residential's
lending operations.
The fourth largest U.S. bank in 2005, Wachovia Bank, N.A., originated
low- and no-documentation loans through its two mortgage subsidiaries.
Wachovia Bank originated such large quantities of these loans-termed
Alt-A loans-that by the first half of 2007, Wachovia Bank was the twelfth
largest Alt-A lender in the country. These loans performed so poorly that
between December 31, 2006 and September 30, 2008, the bank's ratio of
net write-offs on its closed-end home loans to its total outstanding loans
jumped 2,400%. Concomitantly, the bank's parent company, Wachovia
Corporation, reported its first quarterly loss in years due to rising defaults
on option ARMs made by Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, and its Golden West
predecessor. Public concern over Wachovia's loan losses triggered a silent
69 Authors' compilation of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/default.htm.70 See Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Insurers Are Getting in Line For Piece of Federal
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at BI (detailing PNC's takeover of National City Bank).
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run on Wachovia Bank in late September 2008, following Lehman
Brothers' failure. To avoid receivership, the FDIC brokered a hasty sale of
Wachovia to Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo outbid Citigroup for the
privilege.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., was in better financial shape than Wachovia,
but it too made large quantities of subprime and reduced documentation
loans. In 2006, over 23% of the bank's first refinance mortgages were
high-cost subprime loans. Wells Fargo Bank also securitized substantial
numbers of low- and no-documentation mortgages in its Alt-A pools. In
2007, a Wells Fargo prospectus for one of those pools stated that Wells
Fargo had relaxed its underwriting standards in mid-2005 and did not
verify whether the mortgage brokers who had originated the weakest loans
in that loan pool complied with its underwriting standards before closing.
Not long after, by July 25, 2008, 22.77% of the loans in that loan pool
were past due or in default.7'
As the Wells Fargo story suggests, the OCC depended on voluntary
risk management by national banks, not regulation of loan terms and
practices, to contain the risk of improvident loans. A speech by the then-
Acting Comptroller, Julie Williams, confirmed as much. In 2005,
Comptroller Williams, in a speech to risk managers at banks, coached them
on how to "manage[]" the risks of no-doc loans through debt collection,
higher reserves, and prompt loss recognition.72 Securitization was another
such risk management device. Three years later, in 2008, the Treasury
Department's Inspector General issued a report that was critical of the
OCC's supervision of risky loans.73 Among other things, the Inspector
General criticized the OCC for not instituting formal enforcement actions
while lending problems were still manageable in size. In his written
response to the Inspector General, Comptroller John Dugan conceded
"there were shortcomings in [our] execution of [our] supervisory process"
and ordered OCC examiners to start initiating formal enforcement actions
on a timely basis.74
The OCC's record of supervision and enforcement during the subprime
boom reveals many of the same problems that culminated in regulatory
failure by OTS. Like OTS, the OCC avoided formal enforcement actions
in most instances in favor of examinations and informal enforcement.
71 Authors' compilation of data located in the static pool report for BCAPB LLC Trust 2007-ABI,
available at http://www.bcapllc.com/BCAPB2007-AB I .htm.
72 Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the BAI National Loan
Review Conference 5-6 (Mar. 21, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
release/2005-34a.pdO.
73 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS:
MATERIAL LOSS REVIEW OF ANB FINANCIAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 1 (2008) (critiquing the
OCC's supervision of ANB Financial, National Association).
74 1d. at 3, 27.
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Neither of these supervisory tools obtained compliance with the OCC's
2004 rule prohibiting loans to borrowers who could not repay. Although
the OCC supplemented that rule later on with more detailed guidances, 75
some of the largest national banks and their subsidiaries apparently decided
that they could ignore the guidances, judging from their lax lending in late
2006 and in 2007. The OCC's emphasis on managing credit risk through
securitization, reserves, and loss recognition, instead of through product
regulation, likely encouraged that laissezfaire attitude by national banks.
c. Judging by Results: Loan Performance By Charter
In defense of federal preemption, OCC and OTS regulators have
argued that under the umbrella of federal preemption, their agencies offer
"comprehensive" supervision resulting in lower default rates on residential
mortgages. The evidence shows otherwise.
Recent data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reports
that among depository institutions, federal thrift institutions had the worst
default rate for one-to-four family residential mortgages from 2006
through 2008. National banks had the second worst record in 2007 and
2008. (See Figure 6.)
Figure 6. Total Performance of Residential Mortgages by Depository
Institution Lenders
76
1-4 family residential loans (30+ days past due or
in nonaccrual), by charter type
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75 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing statements and guidelines).
76 Authors' compilation of data located in the FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions,
available at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp.
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These data undercut the assertion that federal preemption reduces
default rates among mortgages by depository institution lenders. To the
contrary, the lowest default rates were at state banks and thrifts which are
subject both to state and federal regulation.
d. Coda
After the magnitude of the subprime debacle became known, federal
regulators became adept at blaming the states for not regulating
independent mortgage lenders and brokers effectively. Certainly, some
states regulated these actors more heavily than others and some states
failed to regulate them at all. But the attack on the states obscures two
essential facts. First, by the end of 2005, the majority of states had enacted
comprehensive laws of varying strengths to address improvident subprime
loans. Indeed, proactive states adopted their laws years before the OCC,
OTS, and the Federal Reserve Board took any meaningful action. Second,
through their preemption rules, the OCC and OTS blocked enforcement of
the most meaningful body of laws regulating reckless loan products-the
state mini-HOEPA laws-for federal savings associations, national banks,
and their mortgage lending subsidiaries. The Federal Reserve Board
meanwhile refused to exercise its authority under HOEPA to correct the
unlevel playing field by promulgating binding rules against unfair and
deceptive acts and practices that applied to virtually all lenders nationwide.
As a result, meaningful regulation was non-existent at worst and
ineffective at best for lenders cloaked with federal preemption and for
lenders in unregulated states.
B. Capital Markets Regulation
Regulatory failure was most visible in the mortgage origination
market. Behind the scenes in capital markets regulation, however, other
types of regulatory failure served to compound the risks taken by private-
label securitization. For instance, an obscure decision by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in 2004 allowed the five top investment banks
to reduce their capital to miniscule levels and become dangerously
leveraged.77 In the process, almost all of those banks took outsize risks in
subprime securitizations because they had very little skin in the game.
Similarly, had there been laws imposing liability on investment banks and
other securitizers of subprime mortgages for financing abusive loans,
securitizers might have exercised real due diligence. Because successful
77 See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 &
240) (describing the alternative net capital method and requirements for qualification); Stephen
Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al
(commenting on the application of the alternative net capital method to major investment firms).
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lawsuits were exceedingly difficult to bring, securitizers had no liability to
curb their moral hazard and force them to perform serious due diligence.78
A successful bipartisan campaign to deregulate credit default swaps a
decade ago also hastened the housing bubble and its aftermath. In a
properly functioning market, credit default swaps could have helped
contain the overheated housing market that fed on lax loans. Because they
were left unregulated, however, credit default swaps ultimately increased
systemic risk by linking the solvency of major financial firms to the full
performance of interlinked contractual obligations.
These two major gaps in capital regulation and credit default swap
oversight drove the global financial system to near-collapse in 2008. Both
of these gaps were by design.
1. Lax Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation
Four years after the Securities and Exchange Commission decided to
exempt the five largest U.S. investment banks from mandatory capital
standards, all five underwent near-collapse in 2008. In March of that year,
Bear Steams was saved only through a $29 billion infusion of cash from
the Federal Reserve Board and a shotgun wedding to JPMorgan Chase.
Almost six months later to the day, the federal government allowed
Lehman Brothers to fail. In the maelstrom that ensued, Merrill Lynch
hastily brokered its sale to Bank of America. The last two leading
independent Wall Street firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, filed
rush applications to become bank holding companies in order to assure
permanent access to the Fed's discount window.79
Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch were brought to
their knees by bad subprime mortgage-backed securities and CDOs.
However, the immediate reason for their rapid declines lies not so much
with their asset holdings as with their funding structure. All five
investment banks were highly leveraged in early 2008 and depended on
short-term debt in the form of tri-party repos and other instruments for the
bulk of their financing. When the market lost confidence in the quality of
the subprime collateral that Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers posted for a
large portion of their debt, their funding evaporated virtually overnight.
The ability of the five investment banks to become so leveraged dates
back to a 2004 regulatory decision by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. That year, at the urging of the five investment banks, the
SEC relaxed the maximum leverage ratios for investment banks with more
78 Frequently, the state holder-in-due course rule shielded securitizers from liability to injured
borrowers for fraud or abusive loans. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 2041.
79 See Labaton, supra note 77, at A] (describing both the exemptions granted and the subsequent
fates of Bear Steams, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley).
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than $5 billion in assets.8° As it happened, only Bear Steams, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs exceeded
that asset threshold.
Leverage ratios limit how much debt banks can take on for every
dollar in equity. The lower the leverage ratio, the more capital an
investment bank has as a buffer against loss. Similarly, lower leverage
ratios serve as a natural brake against excessive risk. The SEC's obscure
2004 rule, known as the "net capital" rule, essentially outsourced minimum
capital requirements to the five largest investment banks by allowing them
to set their own minimum capital levels using their internal mathematical
models.81
The five investment banks took full advantage of the net capital rule.
At its demise, Bear Steams had a leverage ratio of 33, meaning that it
borrowed $33 for every $1 in equity.82 In 2007, Morgan Stanley's ratio
was equally high.83 That year, Merrill Lynch's leverage ratio climbed to
31.9 from 15 in 2003, and Goldman Sachs' ratio topped out at 28.
84
Meanwhile, Lehman Brothers' leverage ratio on March 31, 2008, stood at
31.7.85 In contrast, large, internationally active commercial banks have
leverage ratios of about 11.86
As a quidpro quo for the net capital rule, the SEC required the holding
companies of all investment banks that took advantage of that rule to
consent to group-wide supervision and examination by the SEC.87 By
statute, the SEC lacks formal legislative authority to regulate the holding
80 See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entitities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428, 34,451 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200 & 240) (relaxing minimum net capital levels for qualifying firms); Labaton, supra note 77, at Al
(stating the investment banks sought an exemption to allow them to take on additional debt).
81 See Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entitities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 &
240) (amending the net capital rule under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Labaton, supra note
77, at Al (reporting on the net capital rule and self-policing by firms).
82 See Labaton, supra note 77, at Al.
83 Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street
Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis-End of Traditional Investment Banking, as Storied
Firms Face Closer Supervision and Stringent New Capital Requirements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008
at Al.
See id. (providing leverage ratio data for Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs); Susan Pulliam,
Serena Ng & Randall Smith, Merrill Upped Ante as Boom in Mortgage Bonds Fizzled, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 16, 2008, at AI (noting Merill Lynch's leverage ratio stood at 31.9).
85 See Louise Story, Making Trouble for Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at C1 (stating
Lehman Brothers' leverage ratio as of the end of 2008's first quarter).
86 See Jon Hilsenrath, Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street
Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis-End of Traditional Investment Banking, as Storied
Firms Face Closer Supervision and Stringent New Capital Requirements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008
at Al (providing leverage ratio data for commercial banks).
87 Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 & 240); see
also Labaton, supra note 77, at Al (noting that the 2004 rule gave the SEC a "window" into the banks'
risky behavior).
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companies of investment banks.88 Nevertheless, the European Union was
insisting at the time that the SEC regulate the parent companies, otherwise
the EU would regulate the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. investment banks
operating in Europe. Thus, the agreement by the largest investment banks
to submit to SEC oversight in exchange for looser capital requirements was
a means of freeing the investment banks' European operations from EU
supervision.89
Despite these holes in SEC oversight of consolidated holding
companies, the agency had warning of the problems that destroyed Bear
Steams, but ignored them. In September 2008, the SEC's Inspector
General issued a report concluding that the SEC
became aware of numerous potential red flags prior to Bear
Steams' collapse, regarding its concentration of mortgage
securities, high leverage, shortcomings of risk management
in mortgage-backed securities and lack of compliance with
the spirit of certain Basel II standards, but did not take
actions to limit these risk factors.90
This remained the case even after the collapse of two Bear Steams hedge
funds in June 2007. According to the Inspector General, "it is undisputable
[sic] that the [consolidated oversight] program failed to carry out its
mission in its oversight of Bear Steams ....
After the rule came out, however, the SEC did not take parent
company oversight seriously. The office that the SEC created to examine
the holding companies only had seven staff members assigned to monitor
five global financial empires with combined assets exceeding $4 trillion.92
What was supposed to be' SEC oversight at the consolidated holding
company level instead devolved into industry self-regulation. In late
September 2008, the SEC finally dismantled the program, after the SEC's
Chairman Christopher Cox admitted: "[V]oluntary regulation does not
work."
93
88 See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm'n, Address at the Seniors
Summit: Protecting Senior Investors in Today's Markets (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch092208cc.htm ("[T]he merger of Bear Steams and J.P. Morgan
highlighted the inherent problems with the lack of any statutory authority for the SEC, or indeed any
government agency, to regulate investment bank holding companies.").
89 See Labaton, supra note 77, at Al (stating that the Europeans would agree not to regulate
foreign subsideraries of the investment banks only if the SEC would regulate the parent companies).
9o U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC's
OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY
PROGRAM ix (2008), available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/aboutoigtaudit/2008/446-a.pdf.
9' Id. at viii.
92 Labaton, supra note 77, at Al.
93 Id.
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2. Credit Default Swaps
In the capital markets arena, Congress also deserves blame for the
housing price bubble and the systemic risk. As we describe below,
94
Congress could have helped to place a brake on the resulting contagion of
global proportions by authorizing regulation of credit default swaps and the
creation of a well-functioning market for those swaps. Instead, twice over
the past decade, Congress granted blanket exemptions for credit default
swaps from regulation by statute.
95
A triad of extraordinary events in 2008-the federal government's
rescue of Bear Steams, its bailout of AIG, and its decision to let Lehman
Brothers fail, with catastrophic consequences-were united by a common
thread. This common thread consisted of the federal government's
concern over whether credit default swap ("CDS") exposure posed
sufficient systemic risk to threaten the financial system. In each case, the
ailing firm had hundreds of billions of dollars in CDS exposure to other
financial firms.
The idea behind a credit default swap is simple. Imagine that a major
bank makes a hundred-million dollar loan to a major corporation. The
bank is concerned about sizeable losses if the corporation defaults.
Furthermore, federal banking regulators require the bank to hold a
substantial amount of capital as a buffer against loss.
In the early 1990s, JP Morgan championed the credit default swap as a
way to hedge credit risk and reduce capital requirements.96 In a plain
vanilla credit default swap, the bank (known as the buyer) secures a
promise from a third party (the seller) to assume the risk of default and to
pay the buyer a stated amount in the event the loan defaults. In exchange
for that promise, the buyer pays a regular fee to the seller. The seller, in
turn, can buy credit default swap protection from someone else to hedge
the seller's own liability. This is possible because in the world of CDS, the
buyer of the credit protection does not need to own or have an interest in
the loan or bond that is the subject of the protection.
Eventually, CDS were used to hedge the risk of possible defaults on
subprime mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
("CDOs"). In addition, investment banks bundled CDS into offerings of
synthetic CDOs, which sought to track the returns on ordinary CDOs.
Finally, speculators bought CDS as bets that companies would default on
94 See infra Part V.A.
95 One blanket exemption was the result of the Commodities Exchange Act in 2000. See Robert
F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory
of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 171 (2007) ("Where commodities regulation is
concerned, CDS enjoy a blanket exemption under the Commodities Exchange Act.").
96 See Matthew Philips, The Monster That Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46
(explaining that JP Morgan promoted the credit default swap to protect against loan defaults and to free
up capital).
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their bonds. The CDS market exploded as the housing bubble expanded.
By 2008, the total notional amount of outstanding CDS totaled anywhere
from $43 to $66 trillion, vastly more than the debts that they insured.97
To date, the CDS market has been largely unregulated, both in the
United States and abroad. CDS involve features of commodities,
securities, and insurance and thus could fall within one or more of those
regulatory schemes. They largely escape all of those regulatory regimes,
however, due to ironclad exceptions that exempt CDS from most
regulation.
This dearth of regulation is not an accident, but the result of lobbying
by investment banks that profited from the lack of transparency of CDS.9'
Senator Phil Gramm, at the urging of investment banks, pushed through
amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act in 2000 that gave CDS a
blanket exemption from commodities regulation. Previously, Wendy
Gramm, the Senator's wife, had adopted rules in 1989 and 1993, while she
was head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, exempting
some swaps from commodities regulation. In November 1999, Treasury
Secretary Larry Summers, Alan Greenspan, and SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt, Jr., gave Senator Gramm the green light when they issued a report
recommending further deregulation of swaps. The following year, the
Senator finished the job that his wife had begun.99
Gramm also engineered a broad exemption for CDS from securities
regulation. In the eponymous Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Gramm
inserted an exclusion from the definition of a regulated security for all
security-based and non-security-based swap agreements. I°° As a result of
this provision and the fact that most CDS are not traded on an exchange,
those instruments are exempt from most aspects of securities law.
Similarly, New York State-the most likely would-be insurance regulator
for CDS-amended its insurance code in 2004 to exclude CDS from
oversight. 1°1  In any case, the federal changes instigated by Gramm
preempted the ability of the states to require credit default swap sellers to
back CDS with reserves.
97 Gretchen Morgenson, In the Fed's Cross Hairs: Exotic Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at
BUI; Philips, supra note 96, at 46.
98 See, e.g., Matthew Leising, Fed Refuses Banks Request to Limit Credit-Default Swap Clearing,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aaEvfvqK7zWs.
9 7 U.S.C. §§ la(13), 2(d), 2(g) (2006). See Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator
Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at 1.
'0o See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c, 78c-1 (2006); see also Schwartz, supra note 95, at 172(explaining that under the federal act a CDS, depending on how it was drafted, can fall under an
exemption for security-based swap agreements and will be exempt from SEC registration and reporting
requirements); Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2008, at 1 (interviewing Gramm).
101 Schwartz, supra note 95, at 173-74, 183 (citing N.Y. Ins. Law § 69010-1); 2004 N.Y. Sess.
Laws Ch. 605 (S. 6679-A)).
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The only regulatory constraints on CDS of any significance are the
anti-fraud and anti-manipulation prohibitions of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.102 Federal banking regulators are
also supposed to oversee the risk management of CDS that are held by
depository institutions and their holding companies. Other than that, CDS
are unregulated.
Credit default swaps were first devised as a hedge against risk.
Ironically, during the credit crisis, CDS magnified risk instead of hedging
it in ways that had not been appreciated before. The central problem is that
the CDS market creates daisy chains of counterparty liability, whereby one
buyer relies on the solvency of its seller to cover the buyer's own CDS
exposure to another buyer down the chain.
Let us say, for example, that a commercial bank buys a credit default
swap from an investment bank to hedge against default on a bond issued
by Corporation X. The investment bank, in turn, hedges its exposure to the
commercial bank by buying a CDS from an insurance company on the
Corporation X bond. Now assume that Corporation X files for bankruptcy
and defaults on the bond. The commercial bank will demand payment
from the investment bank under the CDS, which in turn will demand
payment from the insurance company. If the insurance company is
insolvent and cannot make its promised payment, the investment bank will
now face full exposure without any hedge. If that exposure is too large, it
could force the investment bank into bankruptcy, which in turn would
saddle the commercial bank with the losses on the Corporation X bond. In
this way, a CDS default by one counterparty can lead to a domino effect of
insolvencies of other counterparties down the line.
This daisy chain problem, in part, results from the way that CDS are
traded. Most CDS are traded over-the-counter and not on an exchange.
This means that each CDS is the product of private negotiation between
two parties, usually with a dealer in-between. In each transaction, the
buyer depends on the credit quality of the seller for assurance of
protection. The buyer, however, does not know how much total CDS
exposure the seller has assumed. Similarly, the buyer does not know if the
seller has bought protection from someone else to defray its CDS
obligation to the buyer. Furthermore, the buyer does not know whether
that someone else is good for the money. And unlike insurance, CDS are
not backed by statutorily mandated reserves or governmental guaranties,
and, in fact, are precluded from this, as we have seen.
102 See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(d)
(2006).
2009]
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
Similarly, the bespoke nature of CDS means that some CDS contracts
are not standardized. Before the credit crisis, it had been widely believed
that CDS contracts invariably used standardized language developed by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA").
Unfortunately, as the events of 2008 brought to light, some ailing financial
firms held large quantities of customized CDS contracts. To the extent that
CDS contracts are not standardized, it is difficult to trade them on an
exchange and cumbersome to unwind them.
The lack of any exchange meant that there was no place where buyers
and sellers stood ready to trade CDS. It also meant that CDS lacked
transparent pricing because there was no central place where prices were
posted. Both of these problems hamstrung the liquidity of CDS and the
ability to settle CDS claims if the underlying obligor went bankrupt or if
the seller of a CDS defaulted.
When the Federal Reserve Board decided to bail out AIG in September
2008, AIG owed $441 billion in CDS obligations on mortgage-backed
securities and other bonds to other financial firms, including Lehman
Brothers. AIG's near-fatal exposure to CDS was racked up by a 377-
person office in London's Canary Wharf, known as AIG Financial
Products and run by Joseph J. Cassano. The federal government ultimately
decided to bail out AIG due to fears that if AIG went down, it would pull
down numerous other firms. That fear unfortunately materialized when
Lehman Brothers failed and defaulted on its own massive CDS exposure.
Later, it turned out that AIG's biggest trading partner was Goldman Sachs.
AIG's failure reportedly would have inflicted up to $20 billion in damage
on Goldman. 103
Under the terms of the CDS that AIG sold to European banks and other
buyers, AIG did not have to post collateral against that exposure so long as
AIG stayed highly rated and the value of the bonds that it insured did not
decline. 04 Starting in 2007, however, many of the underlying subprime
bonds and CDOs that AIG guaranteed fell in value, due both to defaults
and the breakdown in secondary trading. In the first half of 2008, AIG
sustained net losses of $13.2 billion, much of that on mortgage-backed
securities, CDOs, and CDS.'0 5 Despite those write-downs, analysts kept
questioning whether AIG's valuations of those bonds and CDS were still
overvalued, an inquiry that gathered steam after Merrill Lynch slashed the
value of its own CDS to thirteen cents on the dollar in July 2008.106 By
September 15, 2008, rating agencies downgraded AIG, forcing it to raise
103 See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, A Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at Al.
104 See id
105 See Michael J. de la Merced & Gretchen Morgenson, Big Insurer Seeks Cash As Portfolio
Plummets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at CI.106 See Gretchen Morgenson, Naked Came the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at BUI.
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about $15 billion in collateral to meet a margin call on its CDS.'1 7 At that
point, AIG needed a federal rescue to survive, because while it had $15
billion in assets, those assets were illiquid and could not be readily
converted to cash.1
08
AIG Financial Products was not an insurer and thus was free from
insurance regulation. Back in the United States, however, AIG's holding
company owned a thrift institution, which made it a savings and loan
holding company. As such, both the holding company and AIG Financial
Products were subject to OTS supervision. While OTS lacked authority to
prohibit normal trading in CDS, it did supervise risk management.
According to the New York Times, "[a] handful of [OTS] officials were
always on the scene at an A.I.G. Financial Products branch office" in
Wilton, Connecticut. 109 On March 10, 2008, OTS belatedly wrote AIG to
express concern that the "corporate oversight of AIG Financial Products..
. lack[ed] elements of independence, transparency, and granularity." 110
After concluding that AIG's super senior CDS were overvalued and that
AIG's valuation system lacked sufficient accuracy for "effective risk
management," OTS cut the holding company's examination grades for risk
management and earnings, plus its composite examination grade."' OTS
further requested AIG to submit a corrective action plan. 12 C.K. Lee, the
OTS official who wrote the letter, later told MSN Money that "[w]e missed
the impact" of the margin call triggers.'3
The OTS action came too late to turn the company around. Lee
changed jobs in OTS in April 2008 and his unit was disbanded. 14 In the
meantime, AIG missed its deadline to submit the corrective plan and the
plan it eventually submitted did not salvage the company." 5 This history
caused the General Accountability Office, in 2007, to question OTS'
ability to oversee complex international organizations such as AIG and to
urge OTS to "focus more explicitly and transparently on risk management
and controls."' 16 OTS's failure to halt the mushrooming CDS exposure at
AIG was partly due to agency failure. But it also underscores the difficulty
107 See Morgenson, supra note 103, at Al.
108 See de la Merced & Morgenson, supra note 105, at Cl; Michael Lewitt, Wall Street's Next Big
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A29; Morgenson, supra note 103, at Al.
109 Morgenson, supra note 103, at Al.
110 Letter from C.K. Lee, Managing Dir., Complex & Int'l Org., OTS, to Am. Int'l Group, Inc. I
(Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081007102407.pdf.
.. Id. at 1-3.
.
2 1d. at2.
113 Jeff Gerth, Was AIG Watchdog Not Up To The Job?, MSN MONEY, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.conm/InvestingExtra/was-aig-watchdog-not-up-to-the-job.aspx.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-07-154, FINANCIAL MARKET
REGULATION: AGENCIES ENGAGED IN CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION CAN STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT AND COLLABORATION 57 (2007).
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that national regulators have in adequately supervising international
operations in overseas locations with overlapping jurisdiction.
In sum, deregulation and federal regulators' subsequent failure to
exercise their traditional oversight powers laid the foundation for the
underpricing of risk and the erosion in lending standards in three major
respects. First, Congress and federal banking regulators abdicated their
responsibility to nip careless lending practices in the bud before those
practices threatened the solvency of financial institutions and the financial
system itself. Second, the Securities and Exchange Commission increased
the capital markets demand for imprudent loans by allowing the largest
investment banks to securitize those loans with little skin in the game.
Finally, Congress, by deregulating credit default swaps, crippled the ability
of CDS to constrain the overheated housing market and furthermore turned
CDS into a trigger for contagion. The subprime crisis and the financial
devastation that ensued could not have occurred without the acts of
regulatory commission and omission that preceded them.
V. NON-TRANSPARENT AND ILLIQUID SECURITIZATION AND FEE-DRIVEN
PROFIT INCENTIVES
In theory, market controls in the form of risk pricing might have
controlled mortgage risk without additional regulation. But one of the
surprising phenomena of this expansion of nonprime mortgage lending was
that as systemic risk increased, risk premia did not. From 2002 to 2006,
subprime loans with a combined loan-to-value ratio greater than 80%
increased from 46.8% to 64%. (See Figure 3.) Yet over that period,
spreads actually declined from 300 to 200 basis points over weighted
average coupon ("WAC"). (See Figure 3.) During this same period other
risk-generating factors, such as the widespread use of low- and no-
documentation lending, were increasingly "layered" on and compounded,
with only FICO scores remaining relatively constant with about ninety-two
percent of mortgage borrowers having a FICO score under 700. (See
Figure 3.) The question of course is why.
In part, as housing prices increased, the demand for more "affordable"
lending products increased. But the reverse was also true and more
fundamental to the process. Private-label securitization and the outsized
fees gained at every stage of origination and distribution increased the
demand for nonprime lending products. Key to this process were the fees
and profits which were driven by product, both at the origination stage and
the several stages of securitization, including the fees earned by bundling,
tranching, and rating of securities. Lenders and mortgage brokers
competed for borrowers and relaxed lending standards to gain market
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share. They did so with such thirty-year mortgage instruments as hybrid
3/27 teaser rate loans which were underwritten at temporarily low rates for
three years, with spikes of mortgage payments to follow. As lenders
sought to expand their market share, there was no other way to do so than
to compete for loans and lower standards, which also activated more
borrowing.
Lenders who did not join in the easing of lending standards through
liberalized mortgage terms such as acceptance of no-documentation loans
could not get mortgage product and were crowded out of the market.
Broadly, this explains what happened to government-insured lending
through the Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), which did not erode
its underwriting standards.' 1 7 And Fannie and Freddie also lost market
share." l8 (See Figure 7.)
,
17 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-07-1109T, FEDERAL HOUSING
ADMINISTRATION: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES WOULD AFFECT BORROWER BENEFITS AND
RISKS TO THE INSURANCE FUNDS 5-11 (2007).
18 According to the New York Times, shortly after Daniel Mudd was appointed head of Fannie
Mae, Angelo Mozilo, the chief executive of Countrywide Financial, then the country's biggest
mortgage lender and a huge supplier of conforming loans to Fannie Mae, met with Mudd and
demanded that Fannie Mae start buying Countrywide's riskier loans. Otherwise, Mozilo reportedly
warned, Countrywide would stop selling its conforming loans to Fannie Mae and instead securitize
them on the private-label market. Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk; Fannie Reached
Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,2008, at Al.
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Figure 7. Respective Market Shares of Private-Label Securitization,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and GNMA" 9
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And of course the mortgage product that was originated, securitized,
tranched and rated was associated with high and growing fees. But what of
the short and long run risk exposure?
As we have documented, the very process of securitization, in the
absence of regulation and in the presence of specific deregulatory steps,
allowed all parties in the transactions to gain fees and to put off risks.
Originators gained fees but did not hold mortgages, while securitizers,
servicers, and trustees, in the absence of assignee liability, also were
protected while booking fees. Rating agencies also gained fees, which, at
their height, were responsible for a majority of these entities' profits.
Investment advisors and managers were able to obtain higher yields on
very highly rated bonds, also obtaining higher fees and improved
compensation. And investors themselves were able to offload much of the
risk to weakly regulated insurers who were happy to issue credit default
swaps at little cost.
As lenders raced to the bottom to gain market share, the problem of
potential long-run risk exposure was hidden in the short run by higher
housing prices, as the higher prices allowed borrowers to avoid default
through mortgage refinancings or sales of homes when mortgage payments
became unsustainable. But the equally important concealment of risk
"9 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, A Primer on the Secondary Mortgage Market,
MORTGAGE MARKET NOTE 08-3, at 3 (July 21, 2008), available at httpJ/www.oflheo.gov/media
/rnrnnotes/MMNOTE083.pdf.
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exposure came about because these mortgages were pooled into
complicated securities through a non-transparent process. Thus, after these
securities were sold to the secondary market, they remained illiquid in
investors' balance sheets. The important question that this illiquidity
answers is why did the asset prices of mortgage-backed securities remain
elevated at unsustainable levels when the price of risk-that is, the price of
the mortgage-backed securities-did not reflect the likely future collapse
of housing prices, and with that the likely future loss of the collateral
which supposedly made these securities bullet-proof?
A. Why and How Illiquidity and the Lack of Transparency Mattered to the
Boom and Bust Cycle
Private-label mortgage-backed securities were held in portfolio and
typically not traded; they were not standardized and therefore could not be
traded in a liquid market. In a liquid market, investors are able to express
their negative views by short selling, or by taking a long position if they
believe there is possibility of appreciation. Through this process,
fundamental market value is achieved. However, the traditional real estate
investment market does not allow for short selling. It is impossible to
make a bet that the value of a real estate asset will fall.
This imbalance could be mitigated through short selling of mortgage-
backed securities. Short selling would be a market-stabilizing tool if the
underlying asset was perceived to be overvalued or the securitized
mortgages were too risky. Short selling the mortgage-backed security
market would lower the price of these securities, thus raising the cost of the
underlying mortgages to the borrower. Furthermore, the higher cost of
capital for investors in the underlying real estate would mean that the
appreciation of the asset would be dampened.
However, in the private-label market, mortgage debt was securitized in
a way that did not allow for short selling. Each mortgage pool was unique,
making the valuation process by a common metric very complicated. The
pricing of pools of mortgages and tranches of diverse pools was extremely
difficult. As a result, trading of these non-transparent securities was
uncommon and they remained illiquid, priced based on a mark-to-original
model instead of marked-to-market. Only optimists were able to
participate in the pricing process. The illiquid asset class of the underlying
real estate was augmented by the equally illiquid mortgage-backed security
market as prices ticked upward with unchecked pressure.
Although there was no way to short these mortgage-backed securities,
there was a way to price a position on the risk of default. For some
investors who were exposed to underpriced MBS and who may have
indeed been aware of this underpricing-even in the absence of trading
opportunities-could protect themselves through credit default swaps. The
pricing of CDS could have been a way to keep the upward pressure of
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MBS prices in check. They could have allowed risk to be allocated to the
party best capable of managing it and allow market participants to take a
negative position on MBS by increasing the price of the credit protection.
However, as we have seen, CDS issuers were under little scrutiny by
regulators and were not required to post reserves against the CDS they
issued if they were AAA rated. These CDS issuers could recognize the
revenues from these issuances immediately and book the return to support
their balance sheet.
The main condition of this cycle was that the CDS issuers keep their
AAA rating. If this rating were lost, major issuers would be essentially
bankrupt. The price of credit protection was cheap since reserving was not
required. In fact, state action to require reserving was countermanded by
congressional legislation and, as a result, reserving for the "insurance" was
not taking place. Counterparty risk, that is the risk that insurance would in
fact not be paid out in the event of default, had to be perceived as
significant, but the fact that essentially all mortgage securities were backed
by such "insurance" also had to be recognized so that, in the hierarchy of
all entities that were possibly too big to fail, the AAA providers of CDS
excelled. The issuance of CDS and booking of fees both by the CDS
issuers and those "insured" by the CDS, along with the creation of
potential losses of such magnitude that the CDS issuers and the insured
would have to be rescued, gives rise to moral hazard consequences similar
to those posed by deposit insurance during the 1980s savings and loan
crisis.
Unfortunately, as with the pricing of mortgages securitized into MBS,
a race to the bottom ensued as CDS "protected" players and others fought
for market share. For example, if one CDS issuer was overly aggressive in
the market, it could, and in fact did, cause a mass underpricing of risk in
the entire market very quickly. 20 Such underpricing behavior forces a race
to the bottom across the lending institutions, with market-wide
consequences, when the number of underpricers reaches a critical level.
Other companies would face the choice of either lowering the too low cost
of the CDS or exiting the growing market.'
2
'
Underpricing of CDS translates very quickly and directly into
120 In the presence of demand deposit insurance, lending officials of banks have been induced to
underprice risk to gain short-term profits. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard
Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and Evidence, in 5 CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 417, 423 (International Monetary Fund, 2008); see also Andrey
Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, The Inevitability of Marketwide Underpricing of Mortgage Default Risk,
34 REAL EST. ECON. 479, 494 (2006).
121 "The longer the underlying real estate cycle, the greater the value of the put option and the
inelasticity of supply for bank loans, the greater the probability that the market will enter into an
equilibrium in which all banks underprice risk." Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 120, at 494. Moral
hazard and agency issues in the misallocation of risk clearly result from entities that are either
government insured or otherwise "too big to fail."
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underpricing of mortgage loans available for real estate investors and
borrowers. In fact, over the 2004-2006 period, the spread of lending rates
relative to risk over the risk-free rates declined all while the underwriting
standards were deteriorating. This spread decrease is seen in Figure 3.
The column titled WAC represents the weighted average coupons for the
mortgages issued in their respective years, while the column titled "Spd to
WAC" shows the spread of the coupon over the risk-free rate. During the
2004-2006 period, these spreads decreased by as much as forty percent,
reflecting the belief that these new subprime and Alt-A loans were
becoming relatively safe, causing lenders to become overly comfortable
giving out these mortgage loans. This simultaneous deterioration of the
lending standards and the cost of lending over the cost of capital for
lenders was quickly absorbed by the underlying real estate equity markets
through higher asset prices. The higher asset prices were then sustainable
only as long as the lending standards and cost of credit stayed at their lows.
B. Modeling the Effect of Deregulation
Higher asset pricing came with the underpricing of risk and
deterioration in lending standards, which as we have seen were enabled by
deregulation and by the lack of regulation in the face of these new
instruments. These price rises were not incidental or accidental, but the
inevitable result of lending standard deterioration with underpricing of risk.
In other words, when the risk premium on residential mortgages drops to
an artificially low level, housing prices go up, leading to an asset bubble
and creating a breeding ground for market fraud. The result is that the
consequences of lax lending are covered up, and thus markets are not
disciplined by immediate failure.
This can be seen mathematically, as demonstrated by Pavlov and
Wachter (2008).122 Basically, the transaction price P of an asset financed
through a non-recourse loan is the composite of the fundamental value of
the asset, V, the market value of the mortgage loan, M, and the face value
of the adjustable rate mortgage loan, B:
P= V(or)- M(, s(a)) + B, (1)
where a denotes the expected future volatility of the asset and s denotes the
spread of lending over risk-free interest rates. This spread compensates the
lender for the default risk of the mortgage. If this default risk is priced
correctly, then the market value and the face value of the mortgage are the
same, M(, s(a)) = B, and the transaction price equals the fundamental
12 Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Mortgage Put Options and Real Estate Markets, 38 J.
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 89, 92-93 (2009).
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value of the asset. If the risk of default is underpriced, then the transaction
price of the real estate asset reflects not only the fundamental value of the
asset, but also the mispricing of the mortgage, B-M(u, s(u)). If the
market value of the mortgage is below the face value of the mortgage, then
the transaction price exceeds the fundamental value of the asset because
efficient equity markets take advantage of the mispricing. The asset is
therefore assumed to be of fixed supply.
A change in the spread, s, between lending rates and the bank cost of
capital may in some cases be a rational response to declines in the
volatility of the underlying asset. In this case,
aP av 0
-a -o (2)acr aa
Since the spread adjusts to compensate the lender for the changes in
the value of the put option imbedded in the mortgage loan,
aM OMa+ a = 0. If the change in volatility of the asset is fully
au as ar
diversifiable, then aV= 0. If the increase in volatility affects the
av
covariance of the asset return with the market, then a < 0, but stillac"
relatively small.1
23
The response of the asset price to the spread is:
as as aG- =0  (3)
- aCr=,
Therefore, the correlation between transaction prices and lending
spread is zero if the increase in asset volatility is diversifiable, and close to
zero if it affects the covariance between the asset and the overall market.
If, on the other hand, the spread declines because of underpricing, not
in response to changes in expected future asset volatility, the response of
the price to the spread is very different:
'23 Id. at 92 n.6 ("The price impact of real estate volatility changes through the covariance with
the overall market are likely to be far smaller than the impact through changing the value of the option
to default.").
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as = av aM
- 0,- = 0,- > 0, (4)aC as as
therefore,
aP aV am aM (5)
as as as as
In other words, if the decline in the spread of lending rates over the
risk-free interest rate is due to lender underpricing of credit risk, asset
prices move above fundamental levels.
This asset price bubble, in turn, serves as its own cover-up because
rising housing prices enable borrowers who have unaffordable mortgages
to avoid default by refinancing their loans. Note that the bubble and cover-
up are inevitable if misaligned incentives drive the underpricing of the
credit risk due to agency conflicts deriving from the moral hazard problem
of providing "too big to fail" entities, such as CDS issuers, with fee
incentives to produce "insurance." A well-functioning pricing system
would have gone a long way toward preventing this because short-sales by
pessimists and realists would have kept prices in check. In the private-
label MBS context, however, the pricing system did not work properly
because of the absence of deep and liquid secondary markets where
private-label securities and CDS could be traded.
VI. Is SECURITIZATION THE PROBLEM OR THE ANSWER? GOING
FORWARD
There were many benefits to securitization both in the investment and
housing markets. However, is properly constructed securitization enough
for a sustainable housing finance system? For that to happen, certain
conditions must be met. Liquidity is one very important component of any
market; it insures the accurate pricing of securities. In a liquid mortgage
market, private-label MBS must be more transparent and, as a result,
tradable. CDS, the effective short on MBS, must be tradable as well. With
tradable instruments, market participants are able to express their negative
view of the value of mortgages and keep valuation in check. On the other
hand, if there are participants who are able to circumvent the transparent
securitization process, they will gain market share through a system of
underpricing. The potential of short-run profits for some short-run
maximizers will start a race to the bottom that results in the general
underpricing of risk as the housing asset market inflates to unsustainable
valuation levels.
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Efficient markets do not self-organize: they need to be cued and
maintained by regulatory oversight.12f Indeed, as the mix of MBS and
CDS participants grows larger, there is an increasing need for regulation
due to the incentives to defeat a transparent trading process to earn higher
short-run profit. Even in the absence of securitization of mortgage debt, in
a bank-based mortgage system and the presence of deposit insurance,
lenders will eventually underprice risk through competition and lack of
negative correction through market price signals. 25 Although it can be
difficult to detect mispriced lending in a securitization system, it can be
even harder to detect overly aggressive lending practices without
securitization vehicles. Prior to the current securitization, crises have
arisen when bank-based systems misallocated risk between the mortgages
that they issued and the deposit base that capitalized their balance sheets.
The savings and loan crisis in the 1980s is a good example of this
imbalance, when bank competition pushed lending rates lower and lower
as the return banks had to pay depositors increased. Similar bank
decapitalization through aggressive lending happened in Japan in 1992 as
well as in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. More recently, Ireland has
been in the midst of such a crisis. 26
So if regulation is necessary, in what form will it be most effective?
Balance sheet investors of any mortgage related products should be subject
to prudential regulation. First, regulation should assure that the balance
sheets of mortgage market players are well capitalized. When asset prices
are negatively correlated with lending spreads, raising a high probability of
underpricing of debt and risk, consideration should be given to instituting
"speed bumps" that would require higher minimum capital reserves.
Second, statutory product controls on mortgage loans are needed to counter
the pro-cyclicality of risk decisions. Unfair and deceptive acts and
practices laws, adopted before problems emerge and with broader coverage
than the 2008 rules adopted by the Federal Reserve Board, would help
counteract the pro-cyclical easing of credit standards. Securitizer liability
provisions in those laws would provide needed incentives to curb moral
hazard by investment banks and other securitizers. Third, regulation
should focus on shifting the incentives of market participants, both in
compensation structures and contracting devices, to favor the long-term
124 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77
S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 249 (2004).
125 Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 120, at 494. Increased regulation of lenders will help prevent
this underpricing. However, there is evidence that lenders will eventually circumvent this regulation
through creative lending practices and structuring.
126 See Richard Green et al., Misaligned Incentives and Mortgage Lending in Asia 4-7 (Inst. for
Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 08-27, 2008); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2009, at MM24.
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reduction of risk over short-term gains. Finally, creating centralized,
standardized markets for the trading of credit default swaps and mortgage-
backed securities would facilitate the short selling needed to keep asset
prices at fundamental levels.
Looking forward, neither increased regulation nor transparent
securitization alone can sustain stability. Moreover, the moral hazard of
institutions that are "too big to fail" vastly increased as a result of this
crisis. Many of the banks are still encumbered by securities that are
marked to models instead of marked to market. Because marking this
mortgage debt down to market prices would put pressure on already
decapitalized banks, this has not been done, creating additional moral
hazard going forward.
Once banks have shed their legacy debt dating from the height of the
credit bubble and have modified loans in an economically rational manner,
they will begin to serve their purpose again. There will be arbitrage
opportunities and opportunities for the reemergence of securitization in this
market. However, the steps we have outlined are necessary to move
forward into a new economy in a responsible way and to prevent the
mistakes of the past.
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